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Abstract
Whilst the growing number of identity management systems have
the potential to reduce the threat of identity attacks, major deployment
problems remain because of the lack of interoperability between such
systems. In this paper we propose a simple, novel scheme to provide
interoperability between two of the most widely discussed identity sys-
tems, namely CardSpace and Shibboleth. In this scheme, CardSpace
users are able to obtain an assertion token from a Shibboleth-enabled
identity provider that can be processed by a CardSpace-enabled rely-
ing party. We specify the operation of the scheme and also describe an
implementation of a proof-of-concept prototype. Additionally, security
and operational analyses are provided.
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1 Introduction
A number of identity systems have been designed in order to simplify man-
agement of identities and mitigate identity-oriented attacks, e.g. CardSpace1,
Shibboleth2, OpenID3, and Liberty Alliance4 [8, 10, 28, 29]. Most identity
management architectures involve the following main roles.
1. The identity provider (IdP), which issues an identity token to a user.
2. The service provider (SP), or the relying party (RP) in CardSpace
terminology, which consumes the identity token issued by the IdP in
order to identify the user, before granting him/her access.
3. The user (or principal).
4. The user agent (UA), i.e. software employed by a user to send requests
to webservers and receive data from them, such as a web browser.
An IdP supplies a UA with an authentication token that can be con-
sumed by a particular SP. Whilst one SP might solely support CardSpace,
another might only support Shibboleth. Therefore, to make these systems
available to the largest possible group of users, effective interoperability be-
tween systems is needed. In this paper we investigate a case involving a
1http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480189.aspx
2http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/
3http://openid.net/
4http://www.projectliberty.org — note that all Liberty specifications have been
contributed to the Kantara initiative (kantarainitiative.org).
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CardSpace-enabled RP (CE-RP), a Shibboleth-enabled IdP (SE-IdP), and
a UA that is only CardSpace-enabled. The goal is to develop an approach
to integration that is as transparent as possible to IdPs, RPs and identity
selectors.
We consider CardSpace-Shibboleth interoperation because of Shibbo-
leth’s wide adoption. Complementing this, the wide use of Windows, recent
versions of which incorporate CardSpace, means that enabling interopera-
tion between the two systems is likely to be of significance for large numbers
of identity management users and SPs. CardSpace-Shibboleth interoper-
ation is also attractive since both schemes support user authentication as
well as exchange of user attributes. In addition, they both support SAML
tokens.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of CardSpace and Shibboleth, and section 3 describes the proposed
integration scheme. In section 4, we underline certain advantages of the
scheme and, in section 5, we discuss implementation issues. In section 6 we
describe a prototype realisation, and section 7 highlights possible areas for
related work. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper.
2 CardSpace and Shibboleth
2.1 CardSpace
2.1.1 Introduction.
CardSpace provides a secure and consistent way for users to control and
manage personal data, to review personal data before sending it to a web-
site, and to verify the identity of visited websites. It also enables websites
to obtain data from users, e.g. to support user authentication and authori-
sation.
Digital identities are represented to users as Information Cards (or In-
foCards), XML-based files that list the types of claim made by one party
about itself or another party. The concept is inspired by real-world cards,
such as driving licences and credit cards. A user can employ one InfoCard
with multiple websites, or can use separate InfoCards at different websites,
helping to enhance user privacy and security. There are two types of In-
foCards: personal (self-issued) cards, and managed cards issued by remote
IdPs. Personal cards are created by users themselves, and the claims listed
in such an InfoCard are asserted by the self-issued identity provider (SIP)
that co-exists with the CardSpace identity selector (CIdS) on the user ma-
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chine. InfoCards, personal or managed, do not contain sensitive information,
but instead carry metadata indicating the types of personal data associated
with this identity, and from where assertions regarding this data can be
obtained. The data referred to by personal cards is stored on the user ma-
chine, whereas the data referred to by a managed card is held by the IdP
that issued it [2, 9, 21].
By default, CardSpace is supported by Internet Explorer (IE) from ver-
sion 7 onwards. Extensions to other browsers, such as Firefox5 and Safari6,
also exist. An updated version, CardSpace 2.0 Beta 2, was released, al-
though Microsoft announced in early 2011 that it will not ship; instead
Microsoft has released a technology preview of U-Prove7. In this paper we
refer throughout to the CardSpace version that is shipped by default as part
of Windows Vista and Windows 7, that is available as a free download for XP
and Server 2003, and which has been approved as an OASIS standard [18].
2.1.2 Operational Protocol.
In order to maximise interoperability with non-Windows platforms, Card-
Space has been specifically designed to use open standards-based protocols,
notably the WS-* standards including WS-Policy/WS-Security Policy [6,
14], WS-MetadataExchange [7], WS-Trust [5] and WS-Security [23]. Note
that HTML/XHTML and/or HTTP/S can be used in place of most of these
standards; e.g. instead of using WS-Policy/WS-SecurityPolicy, a website can
simply describe its policy in HTML/XHTML.
The integration scheme makes use of CardSpace personal cards, and thus
we next describe their operation. Note that the scheme does not affect the
use of managed cards.
The CIdS allows a user to create a personal card and populate its fields
with self-asserted claims. CardSpace restricts the contents of personal cards
to non-sensitive data in the form of 14 editable claim types, namely First
Name, Last Name, Email Address, Street, City, State, Postal Code, Coun-
try/Region, Home Phone, Other Phone, Mobile Phone, Date of Birth, Gen-
der and Web Page. Data inserted in personal cards is stored in encrypted
form by the SIP on the user machine.
When using personal cards, CardSpace adopts the following protocol.
We describe the protocol for the case where the RP does not employ a
5https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/openinfocard-identity-selector/
6http://www.hccp.org/safari-plug-in.html
7http://blogs.msdn.com/b/card/archive/2011/02/15/
beyond-windows-cardspace.aspx
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security token service (STS), software responsible for security policy and
token management within an IdP and, optionally, within an RP [17].
1. UA → RP. HTTP/S request: GET (login page).
2. RP→ UA. HTTP/S response. A login page is returned containing the
CardSpace-enabling tags in which the RP security policy is embedded.
3. User→ UA. The RP page offers the option to use CardSpace; selecting
this option activates the CIdS, which is passed the RP policy. If this
is the first time that this RP has been contacted, the CIdS will display
the identity of the RP, giving the user the option to either proceed or
abort the protocol.
4. CIdS → InfoCards. The CIdS, after evaluating the RP policy, high-
lights those InfoCards matching the policy and greys out the rest.
InfoCards previously used for this RP are displayed in the upper half
of the selector screen.
5. User → CIdS. The user chooses a personal card. (Alternatively, the
user could create and choose a new personal card). The user can
preview the card (with its associated claims) to ensure that they are
willing to release the claim values. Of the claims specified in an In-
foCard, only those requested in the RP policy will be passed to the
requesting RP.
6. CIdS 
 SIP. The CIdS creates and sends a SAML-based Request
Security Token (RST) to the SIP, which responds with a SAML-based
Request Security Token Response (RSTR).
7. CIdS → UA → RP. The RSTR is passed to the UA, which forwards
it to the RP.
8. RP→ User. The RP verifies the token, and, if satisfied, grants access.
2.1.3 Private Personal Identifiers (PPIDs).
When a user creates a new personal card, CardSpace generates an ID and a
master key for this card. The card ID is a globally unique identifier (GUID),
and the master key is 32 bytes of random data. When a user first uses a
personal card at a particular RP, CardSpace generates a site-specific PPID
by combining the card ID with data taken from the RP certificate, and a
site-specific signature key pair by combining the card master key with data
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taken from the RP certificate. The RP domain name and/or IP address is
used if no RP certificate is available.
Since the PPID and key pair are RP-specific, the PPID does not function
as a global user identifier, helping to enhance user privacy and reduce the
impact of PPID compromise. The CIdS displays a shortened version of the
PPID to protect against social engineering attacks and improve readability.
When a user first interacts with an RP using CardSpace, the RP retrieves
the PPID and the public key from the received SAML security token, and
stores them. If a personal InfoCard is re-used at a site, the supplied security
token will contain the same PPID and public key as used previously, and
will be signed using the corresponding private key. The RP compares the
received PPID and public key with its stored values, and verifies the digital
signature.
The PPID could be used on its own as a shared secret to authenticate
a user to an RP. However, it is recommended that the associated (public)
signature verification key, as held by the RP, should always be used to verify
the signed security token to provide a more robust authentication method [9].
2.1.4 Proof Keys.
A SAML security token can be coupled with cryptographic evidence to
demonstrate the sender’s rightful possession of the token [17, 24]. To achieve
this, a security token can be associated with symmetric or asymmetric proof
keys. If a symmetric key token is requested by the RP, a shared secret proof
key is established between the CIdS and the CardSpace-enabled IdP [24],
which is then revealed to the RP. If an asymmetric key token is requested,
the CIdS generates an ephemeral RSA key pair and sends the public part
of the key (along with a supporting signature proving ownership of the cor-
responding private key) to the CardSpace-enabled IdP [24]. If approved by
the IdP, the public part is then sent to the RP in the security token and the
private part of the RSA key pair is used by the client to prove the subject’s
rightful possession of the security token. Although the use of such a key
may not be as efficient as the symmetric approach, it helps to protect user
privacy since the RP identity does not need to be disclosed to the IdP.
Note that the default behaviour of the CIdS is different in the special case
of browser-based client interactions with a website, in which case ‘bearer’
tokens are requested. Because a web browser is only capable of submitting
a token to a website passively over HTTP without any proof-of-possession,
bearer tokens with no proof keys are used [22].
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2.2 Shibboleth
2.2.1 Introduction.
The Shibboleth specifications define a set of interactions between an IdP
and an SP to support single sign-on and attribute exchange [13]. It is esti-
mated that over 4 million university students, staff, and faculty are involved
in Shibboleth federations8. In addition to IdPs and SPs, the Shibboleth
architecture includes an optional component called WAYF (Where Are You
From), supporting IdP discovery. Alternatively, the role of the this compo-
nent can be taken by the SP. Shibboleth supports the following profiles.
• Browser Post Profile (BPP). In this profile the SAML messages
exchanged between the IdP and SP are embedded in HTML forms,
which can be sent automatically by JavaScript-enabled browsers. The
scheme proposed here supports this profile.
• Artifact Profile. This profile involves embedding an artifact (i.e.
an opaque reference) in a URL exchanged between the IdP and SP
via browser redirection. It also requires direct (back-channel) SP-
IdP communication, where the SP uses the artifact to retrieve the
full SAML assertion from the IdP. As it requires direct SP-IdP com-
munication, which is inconsistent with the CardSpace approach9, the
proposed scheme does not support this profile.
2.2.2 Protocol Operation.
We next describe the Shibboleth protocol, covering the main differences
between the two profiles introduced above.
1. UA → SP. The principal navigates to a Shibboleth-protected page.
2. SP → UA. The SP generates an authentication request and redirects
the UA to either a WAYF or directly to an IdP. A WAYF is typically
used if the SP wishes to delegate the task of IdP discovery.
3. UA 
 WAYF (optional). If a WAYF is used, it interacts (via un-
specified means) with the UA to allow the principal to select an IdP.
The WAYF then redirects the UA to the principal-selected IdP with
the SP’s authentication request. Note that the WAYF can offer the
principal the option to store their choice of IdP for subsequent logins.
8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shibboleth_(Internet2)
9In CardSpace, RP-IdP interactions pass via the CIdS on the user machine.
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4. IdP 
 Principal. If necessary10, the IdP authenticates the principal
by some means outside the scope of Shibboleth.
5. IdP→UA→SP. The IdP generates a digitally-signed SAML assertion
(if the BPP is used) or a SAML artifact (if the artifact profile is used)
and redirects the UA to the SP. Note that the SAML assertion may
assert attributes in addition to asserting that the user has been au-
thenticated. Note also that if the BPP is used, the next step is skipped.
6. SP
IdP (optional). The SP uses the artifact received in the previous
step to issue an attribute query to the IdP, which directly responds
with a SAML response message. Note that this communication takes
place via a mutually-authenticated back-channel.
7. SP→ Principal. The SP verifies the token, and, if satisfied, grants
access.
Note that two ‘major’ Shibboleth versions have been released: Shib-
boleth 1.3, which builds on the SAML 1.1 specifications [12, 13, 26], and
Shibboleth 2.0, which builds on the SAML 2.0 standards; v2.0 is backward
compatible with v1.311.
2.2.3 Attributes.
Shibboleth uses the SAML attribute request protocol to allow attribute
sharing between IdPs and SPs. Such an attribute exchange is, however,
optional since an SP may choose to request only an authentication asser-
tion. Approximately 40 attributes have been defined as ‘common’ iden-
tity attributes, including the six ‘highly recommended’ attributes, namely
givenName, sn (surname), cn (common name), eduPersonScopedAffiliation,
eduPersonPrincipalName and eduPersonTargetedID [26].
2.2.4 Proof of Ownership.
In many identity management systems it is important for the user to have
the means to prove to an SP that it owns the assertion generated by an
IdP; such mechanisms are often referred to as proof-of-possession methods.
As stated earlier, Shibboleth 2.0 builds on SAML 2.0, which offers three
proof-of-possession methods (also referred to as subject confirmation meth-
ods): Holder-of-Key (HoK), Sender-Vouches, and bearer [11]. The HoK
10Authentication may be unnecessary if a valid authentication session already exists.
11http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/shib-v2.0.html#new
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method [27] can be used to address both the symmetric and asymmetric
proof-of-possession requirements of a CE-RP.
2.3 Comparison
Table 1 compares the CardSpace and Shibboleth systems [4, 21].
Table 1: CardSpace versus Shibboleth
CardSpace Shibboleth
Type active client-based redirect-based
IdP discovery performed on the client (CIdS) performed on the server (WAYF)
Phishing resistance strong scenario-dependent
Attribute exchange supported supported
Self-issued assertions supported unsupported
Identity federation unsupported supported
Proof of ownership supported supported
Pseudonyms used (e.g. PPID) used
Token format many formats including SAML SAML
3 The Integration Scheme
We now describe the novel scheme. The parties involved are a CE-RP, a
CardSpace-enabled UA (e.g. a suitable web browser such as IE), a SE-IdP,
and a browser extension implementing the protocol described below.
3.1 Preconditions
The scheme has the following requirements.
• The user must have an existing relationship with both a CE-RP and
a SE-IdP (thus the IdP will have a means of authenticating the user).
Note that both the RP and the user must trust the IdP.
• The CE-RP must not employ an STS. Instead, the RP must express
its security policy using HTML/XHTML, and interactions between
the CIdS and the RP must be based on HTTP/S via a web browser
(a simpler and probably more common scenario for RP interactions).
This is because the scheme uses a browser extension, and is thus inca-
pable of managing the necessary communications with an RP STS.
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• To enable IdP-discovery, the browser extension must be able to operate
a WAYF-like component and offer the user the option to store their
choice of IdP for future logins.
• The CE-RP must incorporate three pieces of functionality outside of
that normally required of a CE-RP:
– it must be capable of processing SAML 2.0 tokens;
– it must be capable of processing a ‘CardSpace-like’ SAML token
provided by the browser extension, which includes a signed SAML
assertion generated by a SE-IdP and a signed SAML assertion
generated by the SIP on the client machine; and
– it must be capable of verifying the signature of a SE-IdP on a
SAML assertion, as included in the SAML token provided by the
extension.
• The SE-IdP must be prepared to provide SAML assertions for SPs for
which a federation agreement does not exist for the user concerned12.
3.2 Protocol Flow
The protocol operates as follows, with step numbers as shown in figure 1.
Steps 1, 2, and 4–7 of the integration scheme are the same as steps 1, 2,
and 3–6, respectively, of the CardSpace personal card protocol given in
section 2.1.2, and hence are not described again here.
3. Browser extension→ UA. The extension performs the following steps.
(a) It scans the login page to detect whether the RP website supports
CardSpace. If so, it proceeds; otherwise it terminates.
(b) It examines the RP policy to check whether the use of personal
cards is acceptable. If so, it proceeds; otherwise it terminates,
giving CardSpace the opportunity to operate normally.
(c) It temporarily keeps a local copy of any RP-requested claims.
8. CIdS → UA → SE-IdP. Unlike in the ‘standard’ case, the RSTR is
not sent to the RP; instead the browser extension intercepts the RSTR
and performs the following steps.
12It is thus not necessary for the user to Shibboleth-federate the IdP with the RP (which
would be difficult to achieve given that we are not requiring the RP to be Shibboleth-
enabled).
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(a) It asks the user to discover whether the use of Shibboleth-based
authentication is required. If so, it proceeds; otherwise it ter-
minates, giving CardSpace the opportunity to operate normally.
Note that the browser extension offers the user the option to store
their answer for subsequent logins at this RP.
(b) It displays a WAYF-like component to allow the user to select
the appropriate SE-IdP. Note that the browser extension offers
the user the option to store their selection for subsequent logins
at this RP.
(c) It constructs a SAML authentication request, and forwards it to
the user-selected SE-IdP. Note that this request will also indicate
the RP-requested user attributes (if any) which are to be asserted
by the SE-IdP. The browser extension will know what they are
since they were stored by it in step 3c.
9. SE-IdP 
 User. If necessary, the SE-IdP authenticates the user. If
successful, the IdP generates and returns a digitally-signed SAML to-
ken to the UA, containing an authentication statement and, possibly,
an attribute statement.
10. Browser Extension→ UA→ RP. The extension generates an unsigned
SAML token (with a nonce and time-stamp) that contains both the
(digitally-signed) SIP-issued RSTR as well as the (digitally-signed)
Shibboleth-issued token. The UA then forwards the browser extension-
generated SAML token to the CE-RP, optionally after first obtaining
permission from the user.
11. RP → User. The RP verifies the received SAML token (including
verifying the RSTR signature, PPID, the Shibboleth signature, nonces,
time-stamps, etc.), and, if satisfied, grants access.
If an attribute assertion is required, the RP could, in step 11, compare
the (locally) SIP-asserted attributes with the (remotely) Shibboleth-asserted
attributes. Such a procedure could give the RP added guarantees about the
validity of these attributes.
Given that we have assumed that the RP supports SAML 2.0 tokens,
there is no need to modify the proof-of-possession data since the RP can
use the Shibboleth/SAML 2.0-supported HoK [27] method (which can be
symmetric or asymmetric) to express its proof-of-possession requirements.
However, a symmetric proof key should only be used if the user is willing
to disclose the identity of the RP to the IdP, and if the RP holds a valid
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certificate. For browser-based applications (and also where no proof-of-
possession is needed), the scheme supports bearer tokens [11, 22, 24].
Finally observe that the additional steps above can be integrated into
the CardSpace framework relatively easily, as the prototype implementation
shows.
Figure 1: Protocol exchanges
4 Advantages of the Scheme
4.1 Defeating Phishing
The scheme mitigates the risk of phishing. This is because the user interacts
with a browser extension-operated WAYF running on the user machine to
select the IdP. Hence, the RP will not be able to redirect the user to an IdP
of its choosing. By contrast, in OpenID, Liberty and in some Shibboleth
scenarios, a malicious RP could redirect a user to a fake IdP, which might
capture the user credentials [15].
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4.2 Integration at the Client Side
IdPs/RPs may not wish to accept the burden of supporting two identity
management systems (IdMSs) simultaneously, unless there is a significant
financial incentive. Currently, major Internet players do not provide any
means of interoperation between IdMSs. As a result, a client-side technique
for supporting interoperation could be practically useful. Such a technique
avoids (to a certain extent) any impact on the performance of the server
(since the overhead is handled by the client), and could also reduce the load
on the network.
5 Implementation Issues
We now consider implementation and applicability issues of the scheme.
5.1 Token Storage and Forwarding
The means by which the security token is forwarded to the RP and how/where
the RSTR token is stored must be chosen carefully. We refer to the num-
bered protocol steps given in section 3.2.
The responsibility for delivering the security token could be given to
the SE-IdP (as is normally the case when using the BPP profile). In this
case the RP address could be added to the SAML authentication request
(as prepared in step 8) so that the IdP knows which RP it must forward
the token to (again as is normally the case for the Shibboleth profiles).
Although this would avoid the need for changes to the normal operation of
the SE-IdP and potentially also help auditing, such an approach has privacy
implications since the IdP would learn the identity of the RP.
As a result, as specified in step 10 of the proposed scheme, the respon-
sibility for sending the security token to the RP is given to the UA. Thus
a means is required for giving the browser extension the address of the RP,
so that it can forward the token. We next consider three possible ways in
which the RP address might be made available.
• The RP address could be stored in the browser extension itself. Whilst
this puts the user in control, it is not user-friendly, as it would require
users to manually add the address of each RP into the code of the
browser extension.
• After the security token is returned from the SE-IdP, the browser
extension could ask the user to enter the RP address, e.g. using a
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JavaScript pop-up box or an HTML form. However, this approach is
inconvenient, since it would require users to always manually enter the
RP address. Nevertheless, this effect could be mitigated if the user’s
choice could be stored.
• The browser extension could store the RP address as well as the RSTR
message in encrypted form in a cookie(s) as part of step 3, so that the
browser extension is able to obtain them in step 10. In order to adhere
to cookie security rules [20], this must be done in such a way that the
browser believes it is communicating with the same domain when the
cookie is set and when it is retrieved13.
To achieve this, the browser extension encrypts and stores the RP
address in a cookie in step 3, before the CIdS is invoked. As part of
step 8, the browser extension retrieves the encrypted value from the
cookie and sends it to the IdP as a hidden variable in an HTML form
or as a query URL parameter. Similarly, the extension in step 8 also
encrypts the RSTR (after intercepting it) and sends it to the IdP as
a hidden variable in an HTML form.
As part of step 10, the IdP returns the encrypted RP address and the
encrypted RSTR to the UA (again as a hidden form variable or as a
URL parameter). The browser extension then retrieves the encrypted
values and decrypts them to obtain the RP address and the RSTR.
Note that the IdP is unable to read the RP address or the RSTR
(thus protecting user privacy) since they are encrypted using a key
known only to the browser extension. If the IdP, however, needs the
RP address for auditing purposes (e.g. for legal reasons), or the IdP
policy requires the disclosure of the RP identity (e.g. so that it can
encrypt the security token using the RP’s public key), then the RP
address could be sent in plaintext to the IdP.
Finally note that the Shibboleth specification allows the RP to use a
hidden form variable called ‘RelayState’ to maintain state in an RP-
UA-IdP session. A Shibboleth-compliant RP could insert data into
this variable and the SE-IdP must return this data intact in the same
hidden form variable. We propose to use this ‘RelayState’ variable
in our scheme to transfer/maintain the encrypted versions of the RP
address and the RSTR message.
13Note that creation of and access to the cookie is handled by the browser extension
transparently to RPs and IdPs.
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5.2 Attribute Handling
The two systems (CardSpace and Shibboleth) use two different sets of at-
tribute types14; this clearly causes a problem in creating a SAML (attribute)
request message for a Shibboleth IdP from a policy statement provided by
a CE-RP. We outline two approaches to dealing with the problem.
1. We could restrict the CE-RP to requesting only CardSpace personal
card style attributes. The browser extension would then need to con-
vert the requested attributes to Shibboleth style attributes, and in-
clude the converted attribute types in the SAML request message sent
to the SE-IdP. An example mapping is shown in table 2. Note that
Table 2: CardSpace-Shibboleth attribute mapping
CardSpace personal cards Shibboleth
givenname givenName
surname sn
givenname + surname cn
emailaddress mail
in this case the CE-RP will still have to understand the Shibboleth
style attributes, since the SE-IdP SAML assertion will include Shib-
boleth attributes. However, the browser extension-produced SAML
token, generated in step 10, could be extended to include a means of
CardSpace-Shibboleth attribute mapping.
2. Alternatively, the CE-RP could be permitted to request any of the
Shibboleth-supported attributes. If an attribute not supported by
CardSpace personal cards is requested (and given that the CE-RP
permits the use of any IdP), then the browser extension would need
to be configured to request it from the user-selected SE-IdP. However
if any attributes are required that are outside the set permitted in
a personal card, then the CIdS will clearly not highlight any of the
personal cards.
In order to cause the CIdS to highlight personal cards, the browser
extension must modify the CE-RP policy. In particular, as part of
step 3 the browser extension must (after storing them) strip out the
attributes that are outside the set supported by personal cards, and
14As stated in sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.3, CardSpace personal cards currently only support
fourteen editable attributes, whereas Shibboleth supports many more.
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then request them from a SE-IdP as part of step 8. Note, however, that
such a modification will prevent CardSpace from operating normally in
the case where a personal card is requested. Nevertheless, if the CE-RP
specifies the use of managed cards (i.e. does not permit personal cards),
then the system would still operate normally, since the extension will
shut down if it sees such a policy statement.
Finally, we observe that in order to support the broadest range of user
attributes, the browser extension could be configured to support both of the
approaches described above.
5.3 Applicability of the Scheme
Although the integration scheme is presented as Shibboleth-specific, we sus-
pect that a modified version of the scheme could also be applied to other
SAML-compliant IdPs. Given that SAML 2.0 represents a convergence of
SAML 1.1, Liberty ID-FF 1.2 and Shibboleth 1.3, a mapping seems likely
to be possible.
Reconfiguring the integration scheme to interoperate with any SAML-
aware IdP potentially significantly increases its applicability and practical-
ity; such a reconfiguration remains possible future work.
6 Prototype Realisation
We next give details of a prototype implementation of the scheme which
operates with the Shibboleth BPP.
6.1 Implementation Details
The prototype is coded in JavaScript, chosen because its wide adoption
should simplify the task of porting the prototype to a range of other browsers.
It uses the Document Object Model (DOM) to inspect and manipulate
HTML pages and XML documents. The JavaScript code is executed using
a C#-driven browser helper object (BHO), a Dynamic-link library (DLL)
module designed as a plug-in for IE. Once installed, the BHO attaches itself
to IE, thus gaining access to the current page’s DOM. The prototype can
readily be enabled or disabled using the add-on manager in the IE ‘Tools’
menu. Note that the integration plug-in does not require any changes to de-
fault IE security settings, thus avoiding potential vulnerabilities that might
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result from such changes. Note also that the scheme operates with both the
CardSpace and the Higgins15 identity selectors without any modification.
6.2 Operation
We next consider specific operational aspects of the prototype. Prior to
use, the user must have accounts with a CE-RP and a SE-IdP. We refer
throughout to the numbered protocol steps given in section 3.2.
In step 3 the plug-in uses the DOM to perform the following processes.
3.1 It scans the web page in the following way16.
(a) It searches through the HTML elements of the web page to detect
whether any HTML forms are present. If so, it searches each
form, scanning through each of its child elements for an HTML
object tag.
(b) If an object tag is found, it retrieves and examines its type. If it is
of type ‘application/x-informationCard’ (which indicates website
support for CardSpace), it continues; otherwise it aborts.
(c) It retrieves and stores in a cookie the name attribute of the
CardSpace object tag. This is important since the RP server
will use this name to retrieve the token from the HTTP POST
array.
(d) It searches through the param tags (child elements of the retrieved
CardSpace object tag) for the ‘issuer’ tag and examines its value;
if it is ‘http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/
issuer/self’, indicating that the use of personal (self-issued)
cards is acceptable, it continues17; otherwise it terminates.
(e) It retrieves the ‘requiredClaims’ and ‘OptionalClaims’ tags from
the param tags. It obtains and temporarily stores in a cookie the
mandatory and optional claim types listed in these tags.
3.2 It adds a JavaScript function to the head section of the HTML page
to intercept the XML-based authentication token (i.e. the RSTR mes-
sage) before it is sent back to the RP (such a token will be sent by the
CIdS in step 8).
15http://wiki.eclipse.org/GTK_Selector_1.1-Win
16The CardSpace user guide [17] specifies two HTML extension formats that can be used
to invoke the CIdS from a web page, both of which involve placing the CardSpace object
tag inside an HTML form. This motivates the choice of the web page search method.
17The plug-in also continues if the value of the ‘issuer’ tag is set to ‘any’, ‘∗’ or if the
‘issuer’ tag is absent, since the use of personal cards is acceptable in these cases.
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3.3 It obtains the current action attribute of the CardSpace HTML form,
encrypts it using AES [25] with a secret key known only to the plug-in,
and then stores it in a cookie. This attribute specifies the URL address
of a web page at the CE-RP to which the authentication token must
be forwarded for processing. If the attribute is not a fully qualified
domain name address, the JavaScript inherent properties, e.g. docu-
ment.location.protocol and/or document.location.host, are used to help
reconstruct the full URL address.
3.4 It changes the current action attribute of the CardSpace HTML form
to point to the newly created ‘interception’ function (see step 3.2
above).
3.5 It creates and appends an ‘invisible’ HTML form to the HTML page
to be used later for sending the SAML token request to the SE-IdP.
In step 8 the plug-in uses the DOM to perform the following steps.
8.1 It intercepts the RSTR message sent by the CIdS using the added
function.
8.2 Using a JavaScript pop-up box, it asks the user whether the use of
Shibboleth-based authentication is required. If so, it proceeds; other-
wise it terminates, giving CardSpace the opportunity to operate nor-
mally. On proceeding, the plug-in offers to store the user’s answer
using a plug-in-embedded checkbox; if checked, the plug-in stores the
user answer in a persistent cookie.
8.3 It encrypts the RSTR using AES with a secret key known only to the
plug-in.
8.4 It prompts the user to select an IdP using a WAYF-like component,
implemented as a plug-in-embedded HTML form containing a drop-
down list.
8.5 It offers to store the user’s choice of IdP using a plug-in-embedded
checkbox; if checked, the plug-in stores the user selection in a persistent
cookie.
8.6 It constructs a SAML request which conforms to SAML 1.1 syntax if
the IdP is Shibboleth 1.3-complaint and to SAML 2.0 syntax if the IdP
is Shibboleth 2.0-compliant. The plug-in learns the IdP’s version from
the plug-in-operated WAYF. Note that this request will also indicate
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the RP-requested user attributes (if any) that are to be asserted by the
SE-IdP. The plug-in will know what they are since they were stored
by it earlier (see step 3.1.e).
8.7 It writes the entire (Base64 encoded) SAML request message as a
hidden variable (SAMLRequest) into the invisible HTML form created
earlier (see step 3.5 above).
8.8 It retrieves the encrypted RP URL from the appropriate cookie and
inserts it together with the encrypted version of the RSTR message
into the invisible form as the hidden variable ‘RelayState’.
8.9 It writes the URL of the SE-IdP into the action attribute of the form.
8.10 It auto-submits the form (transparently to the user), using the JavaScript
method ‘click()’ on the ‘submit’ tag, thus redirecting the user to the
SE-IdP.
In step 10, the plug-in operates as follows.
10.1 It recovers the encrypted string from the RelayState HTML hidden
variable and decrypts it using its internally stored secret key. The SIP-
issued RSTR and the RP URL are then recovered from the decrypted
data.
10.2 It generates a SAML token with a unique ID, nonce and a time-
stamp, referred to here as the ‘user token’. The plug-in embeds the
signed SIP-issued RSTR (retrieved in the previous step) and the signed
Shibboleth-issued SAML response message (after retrieving it from the
SAMLResponse HTML hidden variable) into the (unsigned) user to-
ken.
10.3 It inserts the RP URL (retrieved in step 10.1) into the action attribute
of the HTML form carrying the received SAML token.
10.4 It displays a plaintext version of the token to the user and requests
consent to proceed. The displayed text indicates the types of attributes
the user token is carrying, as well as the exact RP URL to which the
token will be forwarded. The JavaScript ‘confirm()’ pop-up box is
used to achieve this.
10.5 If the user agrees to submission of the token, it seamlessly submits the
token to the RP using the JavaScript ‘click()’ method.
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The prototype has been successfully tested with experimentally-implemented
websites (acting as the SE-IdP and the CE-RP) as well as with the current
(unmodified) CIdS.
6.3 Limitations
The plug-in must scan every browser-rendered web page to detect whether
it supports CardSpace, and this may affect system performance. However,
informal tests on the prototype suggest that this is not a serious issue. In
addition, the plug-in can be configured so that it only operates with certain
websites.
If the web browser is compromised, then an adversary could steal the user
token (see above), block the user-RP connection, and submit the token, thus
impersonating the user. Moreover, if the RP does not use https, then the
SIP-issued RSTR will not be encrypted. Assuming that the web browser is
not a secure environment, it may be possible for a malicious plug-in or other
malware to get access to sensitive information disclosed by the plaintext
RSTR and/or the user token. However, the same risks apply when manually
entering credentials (e.g. username-password) into the browser [16].
Finally note that some older browsers (or browsers with scripting dis-
abled) may not be able to run the integration plug-in, as it was built using
JavaScript. However, most modern browsers support JavaScript (or EC-
MAscript), and hence building the prototype in JavaScript is not a major
usability obstacle.
7 Related Work
A somewhat similar scheme [1] has previously been proposed to support
CardSpace-Liberty interoperation. However, unlike the scheme proposed
here, the CardSpace-Liberty integration scheme does not support the ex-
change of identity attributes and does not operate with https-enabled web-
sites.
A CardSpace-OpenID interoperation scheme has also been proposed [3],
which enables interworking between a CardSpace-enabled RP and an OpenID-
enabled IdP, requiring no changes to the IdP.
Another scheme supporting interoperation between CardSpace and Lib-
erty has been proposed by Jørstad et al. [19]. In this scheme, the IdP is
responsible for supporting interoperation. The IdP must therefore perform
the potentially onerous task of maintaining two different identity manage-
ment schemes. This scheme also requires the user to possess a mobile phone
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supporting the Short Message Service (SMS). Moreover, the IdP must always
perform the same user authentication technique, regardless of the identity
management system the user is attempting to use. The IdP simply sends an
SMS to the user, and, in order to be authenticated, the user must confirm
receipt of the SMS. This confirmation also serves as an implicit indication
of user approval for the IdP to send a security token to the RP. By con-
trast, the scheme proposed in this paper supports interoperation between
CardSpace and Shibboleth, does not require use of a handheld device, and
does not enforce a specific authentication method.
Finally, in 2007, Internet2 announced18 plans to develop extensions to
Shibboleth to support CardSpace. This included collaboration with Mi-
crosoft in order to add information card support to Shibboleth. However,
unlike the integration scheme proposed in this paper, such work does not
seem to be based on a browser extension running on the client machine. It
appears that the interoperability functionality is performed on Shibboleth
IdPs/SPs19, which is likely to require significant changes to the servers.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed a means of interoperation between two
leading identity systems, namely CardSpace and Shibboleth. CardSpace
users are able to obtain an assertion token from a Shibboleth-enabled iden-
tity provider that can be processed by a CardSpace-enabled relying party.
The scheme uses a browser extension, requires no major changes to iden-
tity providers and relying parties, and does not require any changes to the
deployed CardSpace identity selector.
The integration scheme takes advantage of the similarity between the
Shibboleth and the CardSpace frameworks, and this should help to re-
duce the effort required for full system integration. Interoperation between
CardSpace and Shibboleth may be attractive since both schemes support
user authentication as well as exchange of user attributes. In addition, they
both support SAML tokens. Moreover, implementation of the scheme does
not require technical co-operation between Microsoft and Internet2.
Planned future work includes investigating the possibility of extending
the CardSpace identity selector to simultaneously support security tokens
from a variety of identity providers, such as OpenID, Liberty, Shibboleth, as
18https://lists.internet2.edu/sympa/arc/i2-news/2007-05/msg00009.html
19https://lists.internet2.edu/sympa/arc/shibboleth-dev/2007-05/msg00021.
html
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well as CardSpace remote and self-issued identity providers. Possible future
work may also investigate the possibility of extending the proposed inte-
gration protocol to support CardSpace-enabled relying parties that employ
security token services.
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